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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES-CONFLICrING

REGULATIONS AS TO SPEED BETWEEN MustatuteI which limited

NICIPAL ORDINANCES AND LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTs-A

the speed of motor vehicles also provided' that the limits set forth should
not be diminished, restricted or prohibited by any ordinance. A municipal ordinance 8 on the same subject, limited the speed of motor vehicles to one-half
of that provided for in the statute. In this case, the question of the validity
of the ordinance was raised in determining the negligence of the defendant.
Held, that the ordinance is in conflict with the statute and therefore void.
F. E. Lawrence Electric Co. v. Enterprise Lumber Co., 62 N. E. 434 (1924).
It is generally held that municipal ordinances regulating the speed of motor
vehicles within their boundaries are valid if they do not conflict with legislative enactments.' But they are void if they do conflict5 However, there
is no invariable rule for determining when there is a conflict. The principal case offers no difficulty, because of the section in the statute prohibiting
municipal restriction. Some cases,' however, without having to contend with
such a limitation, but otherwise similar to the principal case, are in accord
with it; while others hold that such ordinances merely impose additional regulations,' or are a further reasonable restriction, 8 or are supplemental' to the
statute, and do not conflict with it. The theory upon which the latter cases
are based, is that legislatures do not intend to deprive municipalities of their
right to control the use of their streets, given them under their police power.
A few cases 0 have even held that a conflict exists, when an ordinance
prohibits driving above a definite speed, while the statute prohibits driving at
an unreasonable speed. These are based on the fact that the question of reasonableness is for a jury to determine and not an arbitrary-measure for municipal legislatures. It seems that the views expressed here and in the prin-

cipal case are rigid and unpractical, since conditions of local use and situations will of necessity be so variable and subject to such frequent changes
in different parts of the state, that no general law would adequately provide
GEN. CODE § 12603,
2Ibid. § I26O8, (5519, 1926).
'OHIO

(5515, 1926).

§68o-I3, subsec. 2 of the Ordinances of the City of Cincinnati.

'Hood & W. Furniture Co. v. Royal, 2oo Ala. 6o7, 67 So. 965 (907) ; Ex
parte Snowden, 12 Cal. App. 521, I7 Pac. 724 (1916).
'Re Smith, 26 Cal. App. x16, 146 Pac. 82 (I914) ; Jones v. Stokes, 145
Ga. 745, 89 S. E. io78 (i916).
'Mendel et al. v. Dorman, 202 Ky. 29, 258 S. W. 936 (1924); State v.
Freshwater, 183 N. C. 762, 111 S. E. 161 (1922) ; City of Baraboo v. Dwyer,
166 Wis. 372, I65 N. E. 297 (1917).
'Ham v. Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App. 148, 189 Pac. 462 (1920).
'Christenson v. Tate, 87 Neb. 848, 128 N. W. 622 (1910).
'Sims v. Martin, 33 Ga. App. 486, 126 S. E. 872 (1924); Brennan v.
Connelly, 207 Mich. 35, 173 N. W. 511 (1919).
" Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920) ; City of Baraboo
v. Dwyer, supra note 6.
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for the necessities of each case, and unless the ordinances are unreasonable
and entirely out of proportion with the statute, they should not be overriden
by it.
BILLS AND NOTES-CHEcKS-REFUSAL TO CERTIFY AT REQUEST OF PAYEE
-The plaintiff, in an action to recover on a check issued by the defendant's
testator, alleged that the check was presented to the drawee bank for certification and that the bank refused to certify it. Plaintiff contends that this
refusal is, under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, tantamount to a
dishonor, which renders presentment for payment unnecessary. Held (two
judges dissenting), that the complaint was insufficient in that it failed to allege
a dishonor of the instrument. Wachtel v. Bosen, 223 App. Div. 416 (N. Y.
1928).
The right to certification of a check has not been considered a part of
1
the contract between the maker and the payee at common law. The undertaking of the drawer is that the bank will pay the check when presented for payment, and until such presentment is made the check is not dishonored and the
contract of the drawer not broken. But the dissenting opinion in the present
case cogently argues that the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law has modified the common law rule to the extent that the refusal of the drawee bank to
certify, being equivalent to a refusal to accept, amounts to a dishonor, so as
to give the holder an immediate right of recourse against the drawer as in
the case of a bill. The conclusion arrived at by the minority of the court is
inescapable if the N. I. L. is to be followed strictly, and the decision in thd
principal case is irreconcilable with the express provisions of the Act. The
N. I. L. defines a check as a bill of exchange and makes the provisions applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a check? It is also
provided that certification is equivalent to acceptance! It therefore follows,
that if refusal to accept a bill amounts to a dishonor," then refusal to certify
a check likewise, under the N. I. L. is a dishonor and likewise gives an immediate right of recourse against the drawer without presentment for payment!
It is difficult to believe, however, in view of the cases cited by the draftsman
6
of the Act in support of the sections under consideration, that any such departure from the common law rule was intended, and it would seem that the
difficulty with the sections is attributable to a looseness of language rather
than an unevinced determination to change the existing law. As has already
been pointed out in this REviEw,' so many differences exist that it is theoretically inaccurate to speak of a check as a bill of exchange payable on de'Bradford v. Fox, 39 Barb. 2o3 (N. Y. 1863).
2
N. I. L. § 185. For a much criticized application of this section see Wisner v.
First Nat. Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 68 Ad. 955 (I9o8).
3
N. I. L. § 187.
,N. I. L. § I49.
5
N. I. L. § 151.
'JOHN J. CRAWFORD, ANNOTATED NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed.

1916)

247, 251.

7Leslie J. Tomkins, The Certification of Checks (1902)
(N. S.) 127, 137.

41 Am. L. REG.
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8
mand, and certification as equivalent to acceptance," and the attempt of the
framers of the Act to assimilate them has apparently introduced an anomaly
in the law rather than suppressed one. The principal case, therefore, while
departing from the letter of the N. L L., is to be commended for interpreting admittedly loose language in the Act so as to reach a result most consonant with established rules.

BILLS

AND NOTES-FORGERY OF PAYEE'S INDORSElENT-LIABILITY

OF COL-

LEcrING BANK TO PAYEE-The plaintiff, payee of a check whose indorsement

was forged by his attorney, sued the collecting bank, after the collecting bank
had paid its depositor. Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Markovich v.
American Exchange Irving Trust Co., 132 Misc. 128 (N. Y. 1928).
The court, in arriving at its decision, relied primarily upon Section 66 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law,' which sets forth the proposition that an
indorser guarantees the genuineness of prior indorsements. In view of the
fact that Section 66 is available only to subsequent holders in due course, as
2
specifically stated in the statute, there seems to be no trace of authority for
principal case, so as to make a collecting
to
the
rule
of
the
an application
bank that indorsed the check liable to the payee who was a prior holder only.
The courts, however, have rather uniformly felt that it is really of no consequence to the defendant whether he pays the payee or the drawee,' and have,

IN. I. L. § 185.

See,

I MORSE ON BANKS AND BANKING

(6th ed.

1928)

§ 380. In Wisner v. First Nat. Bank, supra note 2, it was held that checks
are so far to be regarded as bills under the Act that § 137 applied to them,
so that the mere retention by the defendant bank of five checks for tventyfour hours constituted an acceptance. This decision led to an immediate statutory enactment in Pennsylvania (Act of April 27, 19o9, P. L. 26o, Pa. Stat.
(West, 192o) § 16129) amending § 137 of the Act so that its provisions "shall
not apply to checks." See Union Nat. Bank v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 249 Pa.
It would seem, therefore, that the Pennsylvania
375, 94 At. io85 (915).
legislature has been compelled to recognize the fallacy of assimilating checks
to bills, at least as far as § 137 applies.
IN. I. L. § 187. See Milmo Bank v. Cobbs, 53 Tex. Civ. App. I, 115
S. W. 345 (1908); 2 MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING (1913) 1171; I FALCONBPIDGE, BANKING (2d ed. 1913) 764n.
I Corresponding to section 116 of the local N. I. L. "Every indorser who
indorses without qualification warrants to all subsequent holders in due course:
(a) That the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be;
(b) That he has good title to it;
(c) That all prior parties had capacity to contract," etc.
Cf. Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Bank of Rutherford, 115 Tenn.
64, 88 S. W. 939 (905).
'Wolfin v. Security Bank, 17o App. Div. 519, 156 N. Y. Supp. 474 (I915),
aff'd without opinion in 218 N. Y. 709, 113 N. E. lo68 (1916) (cited in the
principal case as controlling as to the rights of the parties). The drawee may
recover from the collecting bank for payment of money under mistake of
fact. American Exchange Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. 616, -04 N. Y.
Supp. 621 (1924).
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accordingly, allowed recovery by the payee to avoid needless circuity of action.'
The theory of the decisions' has been that trover will lie against the collecing bank, or that the payee may choose to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit
for moneys had and received.6 The damages, then, are prima fade the value
of the note,' for it, properly, is not for the defendant to say that the payee
should elect, instead, an action on the original debt. Although the end attained by the principal case is eminently desirable, the decision should not
have been supported by a fallacious application of a rule fixing liability on
persons indorsing commercial paper. The security of future transactions depends on the certainty of these very rules.

CONFLICT OF LAws-LAW OF DomIcIuARY STATE AS DETERMINING AGE
OF MAJORITY TO REcEivE LEGAcY-The testator, domiciled in England, had
bequeathed moneys to the petitioner who; was domiciled in Prussia. Under
Prussian law she is of age, but is in fact only eighteen years old. English
law fixes the age of majority at 21 years. She now petitions an English court
for immediate payment of her legacy on grounds that she has attained her
majority. Held, that the petitioner is competent to receive the legacy. In re
Schnapper, [1928] i Ch. 42o.
Some jurisdictions approach the problem of competency to receive a bequest of personalty under a will from the viewpoint of the distribution of an
estate of personal property. Such courts regard the majority of a legatee as a
question of the continuation of the process of distributing the estate. And since,
under this view, the validity' and interpretation' of a will are to be governed
by the law of the testator's domicil at the time of his death, a legatee's majority
'Recovery from the collecting bank acts as a bar to a further claim against
either the drawer or the drawee. See Independent Oil v. Fort Dearborn Bank,
311 I1l. 278, 281, 142 N. E. 458, 459 (1924).
Contra: Tibby Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers and Mechanics Bank of
Sharpsburg, 220 Pa. I, 69 Atl. 280 (igo8). The holding is based on the ground
that since the drawer and the payee were in no way affected by the payment
of the checks by the drawee bank to the defendant bank on the forged indorsement, the indebtedness of the drawer and the payee for which the checks
were given still existed and warranted an action by the payee against the
debtor. It followed, therefore, that the collecting bank could not have received
money for or on account of the plaintiff payee. While the logic of the Pennsylvania court is irresistible on the theory of negotiable instruments, it has
failed to consider the equally logical contra conclusion that is reached by
relying on the principles of trover. Cf. Chicago, B. and Q. R. Co. v. Burns,
66 Neb. 793, 86 N. W. 483 (190).
'The latter basis seems to be preferred. Higgin v. Foreman, 222 Ill.
App. 29 (1921); Kansas City Casualty Co. v. Westport Ave. Bank, 191 Mo.
App. 287, 177 S. W. 1092 (1915); Buckley v. Second Nat. Bank of Jersey
City, 35 N. J. L. 400 (1873); cf. Schapp v. State Nat. Bank, 137 Ark. 251,
2o8 S. W. 3o9 (1918) (on basis of ratification).
'Bentley, Murray & Co. v. LaSalle St. Trust and Savings Bank, 197 Ill.
App. 322 (1916).
'Cross v. U. S. Trust Co., 131 N. Y. 330, 3o N. E. 125 (1892); Hope v.
Brewer, 136 N. Y. 126, 32 N. E. 558 (1892).
'Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 483 (U. S. 1835); Richards v. Miller, 62 Ili.
417 (1872) ; In re Ferguson's Will, [i9o2] I Ch. 483.
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is also to be determined by the law of that jurisdiction.3 This conclusion is
based upon the legal fiction that personal property follows the testator's domnicil regardless of its actual situs.' The contrary view, as seen in the principal
case, looks at the situation not as a matter of applying the rules of property,
but rather as a matter of the capacity of a legatee. The decisions in support of this view' proceed on the theory that the law of the testator's domicil fixes the general qualifications of legatees, but the law of the legatee's domicil determines whether a particular claimant possesses such qualifications.! It
is argued that the ability of an individual in such matters is known best to
the courts of his own domicil.7 Courts so holding are careful to distinguish
between capacity or qualification to succeed to property and competency to
enter into contracts,' because the latter affect the economic welfare of the
state in which they are made. It is interesting to observe that most courts
in which this question of a legatee's majority has arisen have shown a tendency
to determine the petitioner's majority by the law of that state which will the
sooner declare him of ageY
CoNsPmAcY-LmEL AND SLANDER-Loss OF ELECTION AS SPECIAL DAM-

AE-The plaintiff was defeated in an election for the office of county taxcollector. He alleged false statements made to the public in pursuance of defendants' conspiracy as the cause of his defeat and sued to recover the salary
of the office for the two-year term as special damage. Held, that the salary
was not recoverable. Ferguson v. Washburn, 4 S. W. (2d) 574 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1928).
Discussion of the fitness of a candidate for public office is conditionally
privileged,' although comment must be fair and relevant Where untrue state'Harding

v. Schapiro, 12o Md. 541, 87 At. 951 (1913); State v. Bunce,

65 Mo. 349 (0877) (criticised in Woodward v. Woodward, 87 Tenn. 644, 11
S. W. 892 [1889]) ; cf. Crim v. Crim, x62 Mo. 544, 63 S. W. 370 (I9O1).
'TIERNAN, CONFLICT F LAWS (1921) 94.
5
Wooten's Estate, 26 Pa. Dist. 734 (917); Kohne's Estate, I Pars. Eq.
Cas. 399 (Pa. i85o); Woodward v. Woodward, supra note 3; In re Hellmann's Will, L. R. 2 Eq. 363 (Eng. 1866); In re da Cunha, I Hag. Ecc. 237
(Prerogative Court 1828) ; Donohoe v. Donohoe, L. R. ig Ir. 349 (Court of
Appeal 1887).
'See Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 246 (1878).
'See
Wootten's Estate, supra note 5, at 737.
8
See Ross v. Ross, supra note 6, at 246; Kohne's Estate, supra note 5,
at 412. The civil law is in accord. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) 68.

'Harding v. Schapiro, supra note 3; Wooten's Estate; Woodward v.
Woodward; In re Hellmann's Will; In re da Cunha; Donohoe v. Donohoe, all
supranote 5. Contra: State v. Bunce, supra note 3; Kohne's Estate, supranote 5.
'State v. Balch, 31 Kan. 465 (1884); Nichols v. Daily Reporter Co., 30
Utah 74, 83 Pac. 573 (1905).
'Ott v. Murphy, 16o Iowa 730, 141 N. W. 463 (1913) ; Com. v. Clap, 4
Mass. 163 (18o8); Pattangall v. Mooers, 113 Me. 412, 94 AUt. 561 (1915),
commented on in (i915) 64 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1o6. Contra: Herringer v. Ingberg, 9z Minn. 71, 97 N. W. 46o (19o3) ; Briggs v. Garrett, III Pa. 404, 2 At.
513 (1886) (which hold probable belief in the truth of the charge to be an
adequate defense).
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ments are not slanderous per se, the plaintiff must prove special damage. The
instant case is supported by precedent in refusing to accept the loss of an election as special damage.' The loss of the office and its revenues cannot be
shown to be the natural and legal consequence of the acts charged, but is too
remote and speculative. Absolute proof that defendants' statements caused
the loss of the election cannot be presented without invading the privacy of
the ballot. Thus, against those politically dangerous misstatements, which are
not actionable per se, the candidate is legally unprotected during his campaign.
Equity will not shield him, for it will not enjoin the continued circulation of a
libel,5 except under extreme circumstances not present in the instant case;' nor
will it enjoin the holding of the election to allow the candidate time to reply
to false statements unless the election itself is illegal. The common law thus
leaves the candidate mercilessly exposed to slander and libel of a type which
falls short of intrinsically actionable defamation, but is yet cruelly effective
and unfair. To remedy this defect of the common law, statutes have been
passed in Minnesota' and in England,' severely penalizing the guilty party and
'Field v. Colson, 93 Ky. 347, 20 S. W. 264 (1892); Taylor v. Moseley,
17o Ky. 592, 186 S. W. 634 (i916); Otero v. Ewing, 162 La. 453, 1io So.

648 (1926). But cf. Galveston Tribune v. Johnson, 141 S. W. 302 (Tex. Civ.
App. I911) (in which the court was inclined to allow as special damages injury to the plaintiff's political career and to his opportunities to secure public
office).
'An early Tennessee case is authority for the view that if voters testify
voluntarily and " . . . if the loss of votes on that ground is proved, the
law will consider it an injury, but then the words must be actionable in themselves." Brewer v. Wealdey, 2 Overton 99, IO (Tenn. 18o7). Thus where the
election was for the presidency of a private corporation, and the plaintiff could
prove defendant's wrongful use of proxies sufficient in number to have caused
the plaintiff's defeat in pursuance of defendant's conspiracy, plaintiff could recover one year's salary as damages. Witham v. Cohen, ioo Ga. 670, 28 S. E.
505 (897).
'Francis v. Flynn, 118 U. S. 385, 6 Sup. Ct. 1148 (x886); Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Domestic Sewing Machine Co., 49 Ga. 7o (1873) ; Worthington
v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421, 32 N. E. 744 (1892), 2o L. R. A. 342 (1893).

But

England, in general more inclined to enjoin the publication of libels, provides
as follows in the CORRUPT AND ILLEGAL PRACTICES PREVENTION ACT (1895), 58
& 59 VICT. C. 40, § 3: "Any person who shall make or publish any false statement of fact as aforesaid (for the purpose of affecting the return of any candidate) may be restrained by interim or perpetual injunction . . . from any
repetition.. .
" This section was given almost immediate application in
Bayley v. Edmunds, ii Times L. R. 537 (i895).
'Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (C. C. N. D. Ill. i888); Beck v. Ry. Union,
1i8 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (i898); Note (914) 62 U. OF PA. L. REV. 732.
" Conner v. Gray, 88 Miss. 489, 41 So. i86, 9 Ann. Cas. 12o (x9o6) ; Parlor
v. Fogle, 78 S. C. 570, 59 S. E. 707 (i9o7).
'The MINNESOTA CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (1912), MINN. GEN. STAT.
(1913) § 599. It provides, inter alia, that a successful candidate who has
knowingly made false statements concerning his opponents shall forfeit his
office or nomination in favor of the next highest candidate. Such action was
taken in Olsen v. Billberg, 129 Minn. I6o, I51 N. W. 550 (1915).
IThe CORRUPT AND ILLEGAL PRACTICES PREVENTION ACT (895), 46 &
47 VICT. c. 51, § io as amended by 58 & 59 VICT. C.40, § I. This act makes defamation of a candidate a crime, punishable by fine and disfranchisement. It
also authorizes equity to enjoin the repetition of the libel, supra note 5.
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compensating his victim. The safeguarding of the discussion of the character
of candidates for public office, so as to keep it free from false and unfair statements, is of primary importance in our system of representative government,
and legislatures would do well to alleviate the deficiencies of the common law
upon this point.

CONTRACTS-UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL-INEFFECTIVE OFFER OF A BiLATERAL CONTRACT AS OFFER OF UNILATERAL CONTRACTs-The defendant wrote
the plaintiff, "We authorize you to prepare and plan our advertising in accordance with our approval," stating a list of prices, employment to begin with
acceptance of the letter. The plaintiff accepted. The defendant employed the
plaintiff exclusively for a while, then discontinued the service. The plaintiff
sues for breach. Held (one judge dissenting), that the plaintiff could not
recover. Dorrance, Sulliva & Co. v. Bright Star Battery Co., 223 App. Div.
222 (N. Y. 1928) ,
It is familiar law that in a unilateral contract, the promisor receives as
consideration for his promise an act, and in a bilateral contract, a promise.
Courts frequently state that both parties must be bound, or that there must
be "mutuality" of obligation in a contract. Such is true only of bilateral contracts. It is a confusing way of stating that there must be valid consideration.1 In bilateral contracts, it means that there must be such a promise on
each side as will furnish valid consideration.2 In unilateral contracts there
is never mutuality of obligatio. 3 An offer of reward," or for services,' becomes
a contract when what is requested is actually given or done,' though no obligation to give or to do anything ever existed.7 The term "unilateral contract"
is sometimes used with a slightly different meaning, namely, to designate a
promise for which no sufficient consideration was given. The use of the term
in this sense is incorrect. "This term should be reserved for cases where a
binding obligation has been created, but only one party to the obligation has
made a promise. Where there is no binding obligation, the transaction may
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1926)
§ 140 (mutuality).
Consideration is either a legal benefit to the promisor or legal detriment
to promisee. Wolford v. Powers Admx., 85 Ind. Super. 294 (1882) (promise
to give one's child a particular name in exchange for a note); Jamieson v.
Renwick, 175 Vict. L. R. 124 (i89i) (promise to stay away from a particular
locality in exchange for an annuity).
'Rague v. Publishing Co., 164 App. Div. 126, 149 N. Y, Supp. 668 (914)
(Plaintiff did not promise to abstain from selling, but he accepted by doing the
required thing. This was a valid acceptance of an offer to pay him $IO.5O per
week so long as he abstained, although he was not bound to abstain for any
particular period).
"Shuey v. U. S., 92 U. S. 73 (1875).
See (1926) 75 U: OF PA. L. REv. 268 (Unilateral Contracts-When Contract Comes Into Existence).
6
lbid.
' It is for this reason that the courts wherever possible construe the offer
as calling for a promise, which when given by the promisee, makes a contract,
and gives the promisor an action for breach thereof. See Holmes, J., in Wood
v. Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917); and Post v. Albert
Frank Co., 75 Misc. 130, 132 N. Y. Supp. 8o7 (1912).
'I
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be a unilateral promise, or a unilateral offer, but it certainly cannot be called
a unilateral contract." ' In the principal case there is nothing in the letter to
obligate the plaintiff to accept business from the defendant, nor is there anything which bound the defendant to supply the plaintiff with any definite amount
of work. The letter was an offer of an "illusory" contract only, for the words
"in accordance with our approval," show that what the defendant bound him9
self to was dependent only on his own whim or caprice. The offer came only
when the plaintiff submitted plans for advertising to the defendant, and the
consideration for this offer was not the acceptance of the defendant's tender
or letter, but the actual sending of an order for a definite amount of advertising at which time the defendant bound himself to receive and pay for that
particular order. In other words, the letter of the defendant was a tender of
a series of unilateral contracts by which the defendant bound himself to receive
only the particular orders which he made by accepting the plans as submitted
by the plaintiff. As to subsequent orders, the defendant might revoke his
tender, and the plaintiff had no remedy."0 The decision in this case is, therefore, in accord with the well-settled rules of unilateral and bilateral contracts,
although the words used by the court are misleading.

COURTS-CONTEMPT-POWER

TO INVESTIGATE

GENERALLY

INTO

PRACTICES

OF ATTORNEYs-In response to a petition of the Bar Association of New York

City concerning evil practices among the members of the bar, the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court directed an investigation before a justice of
the Supreme Court, who was given authority "to summon witnesses and to
The appellant, being served with a subcompel the giving of testimony."
pcena, appeared in court but persistently refused to be sworn and was therefore adjudged in contempt. Upon appeal from a dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus, held, that the proceedings were within the powers of the court.
People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487 (1928).
Similar decisions were reached in two other recent cases: one in Wisconsin, Rubin v. State,' and the other in Ohio, Petition of Childs.' These three
I WILISTON, CONTRACTS (1926) § 73.
'Under this category come "will, wish, or want" contracts. Wickham
Coal Co. v. Farmer's Lumber Co., 179 N. W. 417 (920) (contract to sell defendant "all the coal that defendant would want to purchase") ; Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Witham, L. R. 9 C. P. z6 (1873) (contract to supply iron "in such
quantities as company's storekeeper might order"). But contract to supply
"entire consumption of phosphate rock" is held good in Loudenbeck Fertilizer Co.
v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 Fed. 298, 6i L. R. A. 402 (1903). Under this
same category come promises of something too uncertain, as to "divide profits
on a liberal basis." Butler v. Kemerrer, 218 Pa. 242, 47 At. 332 (1907).
'0 Great Northern Ry. v. Witham, supra note 9.
2194 Wis. 207, 216 N. W. 513 (i927)_;
held, (one judge dissenting), that
the circuit court had power to adjudge in contempt an attorney who refused to
testify under oath, concerning practices of which he claimed to have knowledge, at an investigation by the court into alleged evil practices among members
of the bar.
226 Ohio Law Bull. 515 (1928); the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to
issue a writ of prohibition to the common pleas court to restrain it from conducting an investigation in which the petitioner was subpoenaed.
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cases seem to show at least a trend of judicial thought. An attorney is an
officer of the court,' and from earliest times has been compelled to take an
oath before being admitted to practice. He may be disbarred by the court,5
or compelled by summary order to return money wrongfully withheld from a
client.0 Being an officer of the court, his primary function is that of aiding
the court in dispensing justice. It has been broadly stated that he is subject
to the rules and regulations of the court,' and that the court "shall have power
and control over" him.' However, the question of the power of the court to
conduct a general investigation concerning the conduct of the bar and to compel the giving of sworn testimony during the course of the investigation seems
never to have been specifically decided until the determination of the Rubin case,
supra, although as early as 1567 this power was apparently assumed to exist.
In that year,' and again in 1654,1° the Common Pleas Court directed a jury to
investigate conditions at the bar and in each case provided for the taking of
sworn testimony. These investigations were not conducted by grand juries,
in the modern sense, but, similar to the recent investigations, were inquests
by a civil court into the conduct of its officers. The Court of Common Pleas
was a court of civil and not criminal jurisdiction' These common law precedents, considered in connection with the Wisconsin Constitution providing that
the common law shall continue part of the law of the state,' and the broad
statutory grant of power to the supreme court,' are believed to amply warrant
the position taken by the court in the Rubin case, supra. The Ohio decision
seems to set a less substantial precedent, the silence of the state constitution
and statutes " having forced the court to find the authority to conduct the in'ROBBINS,

AMEICAN ADVOCACY (2d ed. 1913)

Wall. 333, 378 (U. S. 1866).
'BENTON,

13; Ex parte Garland, 4

LAWYER'S OFFICIAL OATH AND OFFICE (I909).

'Commonwealth v. Roe, 129 Ky. 650, 112 S. W. 683 (i9o8); People v.
Amos, 246 Ill. 299, 92 N. E. 857 (191o) ; Ex parte Wall, io7 U. S. 265, 2 Sup.

Ct. 569 (1882).

As to the power of the legislature to limit this right of the

court, see In re Sadler, 35 Okla. 510, 130 Pac. 9o6 (1913) ; In re Collins, 147
Cal. 8, 8i Pac. 22o (I9O5); cf. Petition of Splane, 123 Pa. 527, I6 At. 481

(1888).

'Matter of H., an Attorney, 87 N. Y. 521 (1882).
'Commonwealth v. Roe, supra note 5 at 657, 112 S. W. at 686; ROBBINS,
op. cit. supra, 13.
'JUDICIARY LAW OF N. Y. § 88, subd. 2, N. Y. ANN. CONS. LAWS (2d ed.
1917) 4181.
9
CooKE's RULES AND ORDERS IN THE COMMON PLEAS (2d ed. 1747).
'2Coo 's RuLES, ORDERS AND NoTICs IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
AND IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH (2d ed. 1747).
1I HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1903)
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1924) 170.

76-78;

JENES, SHORT

CONSTITUTION, ART. XIV, § 13.
supreme court shall have "all power and authority necessary .

'WISCONSIN

'The

.

.

for the exercise of its jurisdiction as the supreme judicial tribunal of the state,
agreeably to the usages and principles of law." WISCONSIN REv. STAT. (I9II)
§24o7 subd. i.
" The only clause in either the Ohio Constitution or the statutes of that
state bearing at all on the point is the usual statutory provision setting forth
the power of the court in disbarment proceedings; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page,
1926) § 1707.
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vestigation in its inherent powers as a court and as an incident to the express
power to disbar. The New York court had as a starting point the statutory
provision that "the Supreme Court shall have power and control over attorneys
and counsellors-at-law." ' This broad grant of power coupled with the common law precedents gives ample authority for the position taken by the court.
The fact of these three similar decisions in separate jurisdictions involving different statutory conditions is significant in showing the attitude of the bench
toward the bar. Although the exercise of this power has lain dormant for three
centuries, its revival when necessary must be viewed with gratification.

COURTS-JURISDIcTIoN FOUNDED ON DivERsITY OF CITIZENSHIP-INTERP.RTIEs-The plaintiff, a non-resident of Texas, brought an action of
trespass to try title in the district court The defendant was a resident of
Texas. Two groups of interveners, both of which included residents of Texas,
were permitted, with the plaintiff's consent, to be joined as defendants. One
group claimed a co-tenancy with the plaintiff in the land in dispute, and adopted
the plaintiff's pleadings. The second group claimed adversely to all other parties. A statute1 required that the judgment in the cause determine the interest of each party. Held, that the jurisdiction of the district court was ousted.
Gaddis et al. v. Junker et al., 27 F. (2d) I56 (E. D. Tex. 1928).
When jurisdiction of a federal court is founded upon diversity of citizenship, if an intervention' be merely an ancillary or supplemental proceeding,' a
lack of diversity betveen an intervener and the defendant is not fatal.' But
where the object of the intervening petition is to introduce into the pending
suit a matter which could not separately have been litigated in the federal
court, because indispensable parties2 could not have been brought in without
VENING

' Supra note 8.
12 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (1925) 2143 art. 7366 [4786]; see Baldwin v. Godfrank, 88 Tex. 249, 261, 31 S. W. 1O64 (0895).
2"Intervention is a method of practice by which one having an interest or
right which will be affected by existing litigation to which he has not been
made a party, may, if he desire, by leave of the court, come into that litigation
to protect such interest or right." Day, J., in Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U. S.
317, 330 (1912).
See also Adler v. Seaman, 266 Fed. 828, 832 (1920).
In
federal equity courts, this procedure is determined by Rule 37, which is as to
interventions: "Any one claiming an interest in the litigation may, at any time,
be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in
subordination to, and in recognition of the propriety of the main proceeding."
226 U. S., Appendix p. ii.
! An ancillary, or incidental, proceeding is one which is incident to, or
grows out of the main action, but the determination of which is not essential
to the determination of the main action, as in St. James Orphan Asylum v.
Shelby, 75 Neb. 591, iO6 N. W. 6o4 (i9o6).
'Phelps and Others v. Oaks and Others, 1I7 U. S. 236 (1886) ; Sioux City
Term. R. R. and W. Co. et al. v. Trust Co. of North America, 82 Fed. 124
(1897); Note (I919) 6 VA. L. Rxv. 124.
"Indispensable parties are those having such an interest that a final decree should not be made without their presence." Inch, J., in Hazeltine Research Corporation v. Freed-Eisemann Radio Corporation, 4 F. (2d) 867 (1924).
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ousting jurisdiction, the entire suit must fail for want of jurisdiction. 6 In
such case, when it appears to the court that the intervention is not really
subordinate to the pending litigation, but is, in effect, a component part of
it, the court must ascertain the matter in dispute, and without regard for the
technical place of the parties in the pleadings, must align them on the sides
of the controversy to which they respectively belong, to determine jurisdiction
If, after such arrangement of parties, the requisite diversity of citizenship between the opposing sides is lacking, the jurisdiction of the federal court
does not obtain.' Such a procedure effectively precludes the use of contrivances
between friends for the purpose of founding a jurisdiction, when, in fact, there
is none.

EXTRADITIo-UsE

OF HABEAS

CoRPus

IN

EXTRADITION

PROc EDINGS-

FUGITIVE FROM JUSTIcE-Relator was arrested in New York for a murder
committed in Boston, upon a warrant directing his rendition to Massachusetts.
Relator, upon application for a writ of habeas corpus in the New York court,
asked for a discharge, introducing incontestable evidence that he was in Detroit at the time of the crime. Held, that the writ should be sustained and
the relator discharged. People ex rel. Sherman v. Barr, 131 Misc. 915 (N. Y.
1928).
The authority for the governor of one state 'to demand of the governor
of an asylum state, the rendition of a fugitive from justice, is found in the
Constitution,' and in the United States Revised Statutes
A fugitive from
justice within the meaning of the statute is one who has committed a crime
'Forest Oil Co. v. Crawford, ioi Fed. 849 (igoo) ; Clauss et al. v. Palmer
Union Oil Co. et al., 222 Fed. 87o (1915) ; Kendrick v. Kendrick et al., 16
F. (2d) 744 (1927).
"Helm v.
chant et al., I
2897.
'Dawson
Merchant et

Zarecor, 222 U. S. 32, 32 Sup. Ct 10, (1911); Berg et al. v. MerF. (2d) 22o (1926) ; 3 FOSTR, FEDERAL PRACTICE (6th ed. I92I)
v. Columbia l-rust Co., 197 U. S. 178 (i9o5) ; Berg et al. v.
al., supra note 7.

1Art. 4 § 2. "A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or another crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall
on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he has fled,
Le delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."
23 STAT. 3597 (igoi), 18 U. S. C. §662 (1924). "Whenever the executive
authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from
justice, of the executive authority of any state or territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or on affidavit made
tefore a magistrate of any state or territory charging the person demanded
of having committed treason, felony or other crime, certified as authentic by
the Governor or Chief Magistrate of the state or territory from whence the
person so charged has fled, it will be the duty of the executive authority of the
state or territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and
secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority
making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive
the fugitive and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he
shall appear.'
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within the demanding state and when sought to answer for his offense has left
its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another state.' In early
cases the courts believed that proof whether or not the relator was a fugitive
from justice tended to establish an alibi that he was not at the scene of the
crime. Consequently they decided that the determination of the governor of
the demanding state that the relator had fled from the state and was a fugitive
from justice, could not be questioned by the courts of the asylum state, for
that would give these courts the power to decide the guilt or innocence of the
relator.' In recent cases the courts have noted that such proof, from their
viewpoint, only establishes a jurisdictional fact, that the relator had or had
not fled the demanding state, and the law today reflects the court's observation
of this point. The courts express doubt as to the propriety of inquiry into
the governor's certification, but they will interfere when they believe an injustice about to be done.' A discharge will not ordinarily be granted the relator on a mere preponderance of evidence, but he must prove that he is not
a fugitive from justice,' either by uncontradicted evidence, or by bringing forth
a great weight of favorable evidence and discrediting the adverse evidence by
showing it to be unreliable. A few jurisdictions, as the one in the principal
case, have decided the questions on a mere preponderance of evidence, provided it is conclusive.7 This liberal minority is growing and possibly some
future day will be the law of the majority because, while the question is a
jurisdictional one, it is still a question of fact and should be decided on a preponderance of the evidence.

INSANE

PERSONS-ALLOWANCE

TO

COLLATERAL

RELATIONS

OUT

OF THE

INCOMPETENT'S SURPLUS INcOME-Application for an allowance out of the

large surplus income of one, very old and incurably insane, with next-of-kin
but no descendants, was made by her needy second cousin. Held, that the eviJ

'Roberts v. Reilly, II6 U. S. 8o, 6 Sup. Ct.

291

(1885).

"In re John L. Clark, 9 Wend. 212 (1832); People ex rel. Lawrence v.
Brady, 56 N. Y. 182 (1874) ; People ex rel. Ryan v. Conlin, 15 Misc. 303, 36

N. Y. Supp. 888 (1895).
'Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 5 Sup. Ct 1148 (1885) ; Ex parte Germain, 258 Mass. 289, 155 N. E. 12 (1927) ; People ex rel. Edelstein v. Warden,
154 App. Div. 261, 138 N. Y. Supp. IO95 (1912); Wilcox v. Noze, 34 Ohio St.
52o (1878); Com. ex rel. Matulek v. Abbott, 4 Pa. D. & C. 16 (1923).
I The governor's certification is prima facie evidence that relator is a
fugitive from justice and the burden of proof rests on relator to overthrow
this presumption. People ex rel. Draper v. Pinkerton, 77 N. Y. 245 (1879);
People ex rel. Jourdan v. Donohue, 84 N. Y. 438 (I88i).
'Robb v. Connolly, 1ii U. S. 624, 4 Sup. Ct. 544 (1884); McNichol v.
Pease, 207 U. S. lOO, 28 Sup. Ct. 58 (I9O7); Ex parte Chung Kin Tow, 218
Fed. 185 (D. C. Mass., 1914); People ex rel. Cochran v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176,
64 N. E. 825 (1902); People ex rel. Genna v. McLaughlin, 145 App. Div. 513,
13o N. Y. Supp. 458 (1911) ; People ex rel. Gottschalk v. Brown, 237 N. Y.
483, 143 N. E. 653 (1924); People ex rel. Merklin v. Enright, 217 App. Div.
514, 217 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1926).
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dence justified the court in granting the petition. In re Flagler, Application
of Mohr, 248 N. Y. 415, 162 N. E. 471 (I928).Y
In dealing with lunatics, it is generally conceded that the court's first
care is the incompetent, and that his estate is to be expended upon him without regard to the interest of his general creditors or of those who might succeed him. Where, beyond this, a surplus remains, it is to be used for his
immediate family. The practice of making allowances to collateral relations
having no legal or moral claim was begun and extended by the English courts,'
and based, not on any legal principle, but on the theory that the court will do
"for the benefit of the lunatic, that which it is probable the lunatic would himself have done."' American courts have also adopted this theory,' but all,
English and American alike, worried by the apparent inconsistency of granting
away the estate of their ward, have shown a distinct reluctance to apply it
Aid has been given to brothers and sisters of the lunatic and their children,
as well as to his own immediate family, but courts divide where the applicant
is a first cousin. Nevertheless, where the need was great, the surplus large,
and the relations between applicant and incompetent, when sane, intimate, aid
has been given even to the lunatic's former servant' Thus, even as they have
urged jealousy and caution, the courts, moved by the special circumstances of
the case before them, have granted the petitions? The principal case, favoring
as it does a second cousin, almost a stranger to the incompetent, whose generosity, when sane, is but uncertainly established, would seem to justify the fear
'In re Flagler, Application of Mohr, 130 Misc. 375, 224 N. Y. Supp. 30
(petition granted); 223 App. Div. I, 227 N. Y. Supp. 318 (1928)
(order modified) ; 248 N. Y. 415, 162 N. E. 471 (1928) (petition granted).
'Dormer's Case, 2 P. Wms. 724 (Eng. 1724).
"Family," a flexible term, has been given various interpretations. In re

(1927)

Ganey, 93 N. J. Eq. 280, 116 Atl. ig (1922) ; Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687,
261 S. W. 673 (924)
(narrow).

'Ex parte Whitbread, in the Matter of Hinde, 2 Mer. ioo (Eng. 1816);
In re Carysfort, Craig & P. 76 (Eng. 184o). For a brief review of the practice, see Carrington, Application of Linatic's Estate for the Benefit of Dependent Relatives (1914) 2 VA. L. REv. 204; and Thompson & Hale, The Surphs Income of a Lunatic (1895) 8 HIv.L. REv. 472.
'Ex parte Whitbread, supra note 4, at 1O3; 19 HALSBURY, LAws oF ENGLAND (I9II) 438; SHELFORD, LUNATIcS (2d ed. 1847) 205.
In re Willoughby, II Paige 257 (N. Y. I844) ; Potter v. Berry, 53 N. J.
Eq. i5i (iS96); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., i8I App. Div. 642, 168 N. Y.
Supp. 952 (1918); In re Flagler, Application of Moore, 130 Misc. 554, 224
N. Y. Supp. 27 (1926).
"In re Evans, 21 Ch. D. 297 (1882) ; In re Darling, 57 Ch. D. 891 (1888);
In re Kernochan, 84 Misc. 565, 146 N. Y. Supp. 1026 (1914); Binney v. R. I.
Hospital, 43 R. I. 222, i1O Atl. 615 (192o).
'It re Clarke, 2 Ph. 282 (Eng. 1847) (brothers) ; In re Blair, i Myl. &
Cr. 300 (Eng. 1836) (nephew) ; it re Croft, i N. R. 185 (Eng. 1862) (granted
to first cousin) ; In re Darling, supra note 7 (refused to first cousin) ; In re
Carysfort, supra note 4 (servant).
"In re Blair; In re Croft, both supra note 8; In re Freeman, [1927] 96
Ch. 225.
"I1n re Flagler, Application of Mohr, 223 App. Div. I, 227 N. Y. Supp. 318
(928); 41 HARv. L. REv. 402; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 525-26.
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of continuing a practice, whereby a court, exercising wide discretionary power,
may tend to require less special circumstances and a lesser degree of probability that the insane person would have granted the petition, and come to act
less as a court of equity than as a charitable and benevolent institution."

SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS oF TRADE-NAMnE ARTlcrEs-The
plaintiff purchased of the defendant a quantity of Barrett's Rubber Viva, under
its trade name "B. R. V.," an oil of variable composition, which proved unsuitable for the plaintiff's business of manufacturing rubber heels. To an
action for damages the defendant answers that there was no implied warranty
of fitness as this was a sale of an article under its trade name.' Held, that
there was an implied warranty. Barrett Co. et al. v. PantherRubber Manufacturing Co., 24 F. (2d) 329, (C. C. A. Ist, 1928).
The early common law in regard to the sale of goods applied the maxim
caveat emptor. Warranties had to be express.2
Gradually, however, the
courts began to introduce the theory of implied warranties of quality, feeling
that the seller was in a position to know more about his wares than the buyer,
and conceding the necessity for the buyer to' rely upon the seller's skill and
judgment. On the other hand, when the buyer described or defined the article
he wanted, he no more relied upon the seller, but exercised his own judgment.
In this case there was no implied warranty of quality 3 This description could
be given by asking for the article under its patent or trade name.' Section 15
(4) of the Uniform Sales Act codifies the common law in this respect. The
standard laid down in this statute has become a harsh, unelastic rule.! By
giving his product a name, the vendor easily avoids his obligation in every
case in which the product is purchased under its trade name. Practically all
the courts, until recently, have construed this statute strictly and held that no

'In re Flagler, Application of Moore, supra note 6 (petition of second
cousin granted without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that insane would
have done likewise) ; Its re Flagler, It re Tash, 126 Misc. 764, 214 N. Y. Supp.
631 (1926) (granted to second cousin); In re Flagler, Application of Rockhill, 131 Misc. 43o, 226 N. Y. Supp. 38 (1927) (refused to second cousin because not proved destitute).
'Uniform Sales Act (i9O6), § I5 (4): "In the case of a contract to sell
or a sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is
no implied warranty as to its fitness for any particular purpose.'
ISee i WILLISTON, SALES' (2d ed. 1924) par. 195.
'Mellor, J., in Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197 (1868), attempts a classification of cases in which a warranty is implied and cases in which the old
maxim caveat emptor applies, the third section of which states, "where a
known, described and defined article is ordered of a manufacturer, although it
is stated to be required by the purchaser for a particular purpose, still if the
known, described and defined thing be actually supplied, there is no warranty
that it shall answer the particular purpose intended by the buyer."
'Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & WV. 399 (Eng. 1838).
'Ray A. Brown, Implied Warranties of Quality in Sales of Articles Under
Patent or Trade Namzes (1924) 2 Wis. L. REV. 385, 404.
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warranty was implied in a sale of an article under its trade name.6 The recent
tendency in judicial construction of the statute has been to mitigate its severity. In the principal case, although the plaintiff did order the defendant's
product under its given trade name, the court held that "since B. R. V. was
a product of variable chemical composition it did not come within the act,
which applies only to goods known in the market and among those familiar
with that kind of trade by that description." It would seem that the court
in the principal case has attempted to restrict the application of this statute to
articles which, because of their specific and unvaried composition for a more
or less long period of time have become standardized and well known to the
trade:' It is submitted that inasmuch as the statute is capable of this construction, without any violation of its text, this is a reasonable interpretation
and might assist in the foundation of a uniform test to aid in judicial construction of this section of the Uniform Sales Act.

SEARCH AND SEIzuRE-ADMISSIanIrTY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY WIRETAlPINr--The defendants were convicted of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act, on the evidence of telephone conversations intercepted
by federal agents who had tapped telephone wires from the homes and office
of the defendants. Defendants contend that the use of this evidence over their
seasonable objection amounts to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments Held, (Holmes, Brandeis, Butler, and Stone, JJ., dissenting) that
the evidence is admissible. Olmstead v. U. S., 48 Sup. Ct 564 (1928).
That the Fourth Amendment should be liberally construed has been re'Folsom v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., 237 Mass. 565, 13o N. E. 197
Quemahoning Coal Co. v. Sanitary Earthenware Co., 88 N. J. L.
174, 95 At. 986 (1915) ; Matteson v. Lagace, 36 R. I. 223, 89 At. 713 (1914) ;
Fox v. Boldt, 172 Wis. 333, 178 N. W. 467 (i920). Similar decisions were
handed down, before the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act, under the common law, or local statutes. Davis Calyx Drill Co. v. Mallory, 137 Fed. 332
(C. C. A. 8th, 19o5); Holt v. Sims, 94 Minn. 157, io2 N. W. 386 (i9o5) ;
Ivans v. Laury, 67 N. J. L. 153, So At. 355 (igoi); American Bank Co. v.
Guardian Trust Co., 210 Pa. 320, 59 AUt. iio8 (19o4).
"In two recent cases the courts held for the existence of an implied warranty on the same theory. Sampson v. Frank F. Pels Co., 199 App. Div. 854,
192 N. Y. Supp. 538 (1922).
In this case the court said, ". . . This is
not the sale of a specific article under its trade name. The property contracted to be sold varied by reason of proper or improper combing." Bristol
Tramway Co., Ltd. v. Fiat Motors Co., Ltd., (igio) 2 K. B. 831. In this
case the court held under § 14, subsec. I of the SATE OF GooDs AcT that "a
trade name or patent name is not one given to an article by its manufacturer,
but one acquired by long use and denoting a definite product of well known
characteristics. Here the makers were constantly making improvements or
changes in their automobiles and there had not yet come to be a standard
product."
(1921);

The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated .

.

.

" And the Fifth: "No person .

shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself."
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peatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court.2 A notable result of this emphasis is the established federal rule that evidence secured by an unreasonable
search and seizure by a federal officer in violation of the Fourth Amendment is
inadmissible, on the ground that the use of such evidence would compel defendants to be witnesses against themselves in violation of the Fifth Amendment.2 The unreasonableness and illegality of the method of securing evidence followed in the principal case is clearly indicated by its being made
a crime in twenty-four states, beside the state of Washington, where the acts
took place.' But the majority opinion states that no policy of liberal construction can justify extending the protection accorded to such material things
as "persons, houses, papers, and effects," so as to include telephone messagesthat too great violence would be done to the plain meaning of the words of
It is mainly on this ground that the court rejects the analthe Amendment
ogy to sealed letters and packages in the mail, which, it has been held,
6
It would seem, howare within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
ever, that the fundamental evil which the Amendment seeks to guard against
is the unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a man's home and affairs,' and
that the phraseology of the amendment is restricted merely by the forms of

2

Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 63o, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 527 (1885). Act providing for production of documents by defendant pursuant to court order
and that failure to obey same is to be taken as confession of what prosecuting
attorney has stated he expected to prove by the documents, held to violate
Fourth Amendment. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385, 40
Sup. Ct. 182 (i919). Fourth Amendment held to protect defendant failing
to obey subpoena to produce certain papers, where the information leading to
the issuance of the subpcena had been obtained unlawfully. Gouled v. U. S.,
Surreptitious taking of paper
255 U. S. 298, 303, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 263 (1921).
by friendly visitor acting for federal agent held a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See Byars v. U. S., 273 U. S. 28, 32, 47 Sup. Ct. 248 (1927).
But cf. Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 28o (925), holding that
federal officer without warrant has right to search auto when he has probable cause to believe an offense is being committed against Prohibition Act.
'Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct 341 (914); Amos v. U. S.,
255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (I92I); Agnello v. U. S., 269 U. S. 2o, 46
Contra: Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metcalf 329 (Mass.
Sup. Ct. 4 (925).
1841) ; Meisinger v. State, 141 Atl. 536 (Md. 1928). For discussion of division
of authority and citation of cases, see CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1926),
§§ 7-10; Atkinson, Prohibition and Doctrine of the Weeks Case (1925) 5o Ami.
L. REv. 728-55.
'WAsHr. ComP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 2656 (18). For references to
similar
statutes of other states, see footnotes, 48 Sup. Ct. 573.
5
Cf. language of McKenna, J., Weems v. U. S., 217 U. S. 349, 373, 30 Sup.
Ct. 544, 551 (091o).
'Hoover v. McChesney, 8i Fed. 472 (1897) ; see Ex parte Jackson, 961
U. S. 727, 733 (1877).
'Bradley, J., in Boyd v. U. S., II6 U. S. 616, 628, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 532
(1885): "The principles laid down in this opinion (speaking of Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials lO3O) affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the
case there before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to
all invasions on the part of the Government and its employes of the sancti-

ties of a man's home and the privacies of life."
LIMITATIoNs

(8th ed.

1927)

637.

I COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
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invasion known to the makers of it. It therefore seems unfortunate that the
Court, through a somewhat narrow and literal construction, should have
withheld the protection of the Constitution against a practice which, in view
of the widespread use of the telephone, can be hardly less obnoxious and oppressive than the general warrants and writs of assistance of old:'

OF

TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXEMPTION CIAUsE OF REVENUE AcT
9i2I-The Revenue Act of 592,.,' in granting to life insurance companies

certain exemptions, for the purpose of computing the taxable income, allowed,
inter alia, a deduction of the amount of interest received from tax-exempt
securities,2 and a further deduction of a sum equal to the difference between
this amount and four per cent. of the mean of the reserve fund The petitioner maintained that it was entitled to the four per cent. deduction over and
above the amount derived from its tax-exempt securities. Held (three justices dissenting), that the petitioner was entitled to recover the amount alleged
to have been illegally exacted. National Life Insurance Co. v. United States,
48 Sup. Ct 59Y (1928).

This is the first time that this section of the Revenue Act of zg2x has
been presented for judicial construction. The Supreme Court, in the principal
case, reasoned that the Act violated the "due process" clause' of the Constitution, by taking away from holders of tax-exempt securities the exemption
guaranteed them by the acts under which the securities were issued; and
that it violated the "equal protection" clause' by granting greater exemptions
to non-holders of such securities. The Court was undoubtedly influenced by
several decisions' holding that tax-exempt income cannot be applied to the
satisfaction of a further exemption clauseZ A holder of tax-exempt securi'Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., also argue for an exclusion of the evidence
on public policy grounds, pointing out that the Government is placing itself
in a position where it indirectly fosters crime by accepting the fruits of the
crimes of its own agents. Taft, C. J., disclaims any such discretionary power
in the exclusion of evidence, declaring that the court is bound by the common
law doctrine. See i Ga NLF--, EVIDENcE (Redfield, 12th ed. 1866) § 254 (a).
142 STAT. 227, 261,

incorporated without change into the REvENUE AcT
§§ 981,

OF 1924, C. 234, §§ 230, 243, 244, 245, 43 STAT. 254, 289, 26 U. S. C.
1oo1, 103, i0o4 (1926).
Ibid. § 213.

Ibid. §245.
S. CONSTITUTION, Fifth Amendment
'Ibid. Fourteenth Amendment, § I.
' United States v. Ritchie, Fed. Cas. No. 16, 168 (Md. 1872); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, 232 Mich. 245, ;2o5 N. W. io6 (1925) ; cf.
People, etc. v. Commissioners, etc., 41 How. Pr. 459 (N. Y. 187o); Miller
et al., Executors v. Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. 280 (1927).
"These decisions are based on the theory that applying the income from
tax-exempt securities to the satisfaction of a further exemption clause would
be tantamount to taxing indirectly the tax-exempt income. It will be noted,
however, that the cases are concerned with direct taxes upon property, while
the tax in the principal case is an excise tax upon the corporate franchise.
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ties often finds himself no better off than if he held only taxable property.5
The difficulty of adjusting any system of taxation so as to render it precisely
If, in its application, the authorized deducequal in its bearing is proverbial
tion may seem to bear upon one company more than another, it is because
they are differently circumstanced, and not because of any want of generality
This decision amounts to a holding that Congress may
in the test applied
not grant an immunity to a taxpayer unless it be extended in addition to immunities already assured him by reason of his possession of tax-exempt securities. In short, the burden is imposed upon Congress of so framing its system of taxation that tax-exempt bonds shall entitle the holder to greater privileges than are enjoyed by non-holders of such bonds.

WILLS-RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES WHO AaE
ALSO ATrESTiNG WITNESSEs-The third attesting witness, being a legatee,
contended that since she was superfluous her legacy should not be made void
1
under the statute voiding legacies to attesting witnesses. Held, that the statute
Patanska et al. v.
even
though
supernumerary.
to
any
attesting
witness,
applies
Kuznia et at., 141 AtI. 88 (N. J. Chancery 1928).
The case would have been decided differently in most jurisdictions, for the
usual statute has a saving clause whereby the legacy to an attesting witness is
valid if there are enough other witnesses to comply with the statute.' Where
the statute requires two witnesses and there are three, all, or two, being given
an interest, a problem is presented. Since only two need prove the will, shall
one, and which one, be allowed to receive his bequest while the other two lose
theirs? In Caw v. Robertson,' all three attesting witnesses were given an
interest under the will. The first two in the order of signing were called to
prove it. Since the will had been proved without his testimony, the third witness was allowed to take his legacy. The court said the intention of the testator should be carried out where possible, and that neither reason nor law required the voiding of the third bequest merely because the others were void.
A similar situation existed in Nixon v. Armstrong' but the court said that
all bequests to attesting witnesses should be absolutely void, unless there were

I Provident Institutions v. Massachusetts, 73 U. S 611 (1867). Held, that
a statute laying an excise tax upon insurance companies and savings banks,
measured by the amount of deposits, was valid, even though a portion of the
deposits was invested in tax-exempt securities. Home Insurance Co. v. New
York, i34 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct 593 (i89o); Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S.
115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829 (i9oo) (inheritance tax).
"See Tappan v. Merchants National Bank, 86 U. S. 49o, 504 (1873) ; La
Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377, 392, 41 Sup. Ct. 528, 532
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImlTATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 1084.
(1920);
20
Cf. LaBelle Iron Works v. U. S., supra note 9.
14

N. J. CoMP. STAT. (igio)

5862,

§ 4.

REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1925) Chap. 148, 18; 2 N. Y. ANN. CoNs.
(Cum. Supp. 1918-i92o) 1753, § 27; In re Tactkian's Estate, iog Misc.
519, 179 N. Y. Supp. 188 (1919).
15 (85).
385Ne.2
'.38
Tex. 296
(1873).
2ILu.
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the required number of attesting witnesses who received no interest under the
will. In West Virginia,' although two competent'attesting witnesses are required, there need be only one witness at proof of the will, and the other of the
necessary two attesting witnesses is allowed to take under the will, while in
Alabama' and Maryland 7 all the attesting witnesses can be given an interest in,
prove, and take under the will. It is submitted that the New York method of
proving the will by uninterested witnesses, if possible, and if not, then by calling the needed interested witnesses in the order of signing, is the best, for
it follows the primary consideration of giving effect to the testator's intention
as fully as is possible under the law.
WITNESSES-IMPEACHMENT

OF

CREDIBILITY BY

CROSS-EXAMINATION

AS

To PRIOR ARRESTs-One of the principal witnesses for the defendant was questioned upon cross-examination as to a prior arrest. Held, that such evidence
is inadmissible. Cons. v. Arcurio, 92 Pa. Super. 404 (1927).
In a carefully considered opinion the court resolves the doubt' which for
some time in Pennsylvania has surrounded the question as to whether, for the
purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness, he may be interrogated upon
cross-examination as to prior arrests. The decision of the principal case seems
to place Pennsylvania within the majority of jurisdictions holding that questions as to prior arrest or indictment 2 are inadmissible, for an arrest or an
indictment being consistent with innocence, proof of either has no bearing
upon the credibility of the witness. It is not relevant 8 Although, according
to the text -writers, the question was at one time considered settled in this state,'
'Davis v. Davis, 43 W. Va. 300, 27 S. E. 323 (I897). Criticised in Bruce
io8 Va. 670, 62 S. E. 973 (19o8), 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 686 (1912).
v. Shuler,
6
Kumpe v. Coons, 63 Ala. 448 (1879).
7
Estep v. Morris, 38 Md. 417 (873).
1Stout v. Rassel, 2 Yeates 334, 338 (Pa. 1798) ; Elliott v. Bolles, 31 Pa.
65 (i85i) (a witness may not be interrogated as to particular acts of misconduct) ; Buck v. Coin., io7 Pa. 486 (1884) (although the question of prior
arrest was before the court, it considers the proper method of proving a prior
conviction); Com. v. Racco, 225 Pa. 113, 73 Atl. io67 (io9) (overrules the
Buck case) quoting UNDERHILL, CRlm. EVIDENc E (1st ed. 1898) §§ 6o, 61: "He
(the accused testifying in his own behalf) may be questioned as to separate facts
calculated to discredit him. Thus his previous arrest or indictment . . . may
all be brought out by questions . . . " See Com. v. Doe, 79 Pa. Super.
62, 67 (1922); (1923) 7r U. OF PA. L. REV. 173, 174. But see Com. v. Varano, 258 Pa. 442, 102 AUt. 131 (1917); Marshall v. Carr, 271 Pa. 271, 114
Ad. 5oo (1921); Weiss v. Guarantee Co., 285 Pa. 251, 132 Ad. 120 (1926) ;
Com. v. Keegan, 70 Pa. Super. 436 (1918). For thorough discussion see report of principal case pp. 404-415.
2A prior indictment is usually considered in the same class as a prior
arrest, both being accusations only. Note, 82 A. S. R. 25, 38 (1902) ; 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 982.
'Glover v. U. S., 147 Fed. 426 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o6); People v. Irving,
95 N. Y. 541 (1884); 2 WIGMORE, 10c. cit. supra note 2.
'I GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed. I899) § 461b "A few states with courage and wisdom have taken the step of forbidding entirely such cross-examination." (citing Elliott v. Bolles, supra note I).
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doubt arose when the Supreme Court, in a case in which the question of prior
arrest arose, confused it with the question of proof of prior conviction.' Texas8
and Louisiana' are the champions of the opposite view which holds that such
questions are competent, saying that even the imputation of crime is inconsistent with good character and reputation. But the question is by no means
settled. Many states hold that it is a matter entirely for the discretion' of
the trial court, ignoring the question of relevancy 9 Several states have applied
statutes' 0 to the problem. The conflict' is not due to a wide difference of
opinion but rather to a former confusion of issues. Had the courts clearly
differentiated between examination as to prior arrest and examination as to
prior conviction, two essentially different problems, the difficulty might have
been avoided, for, as is pointed out by the court in the principal case, proof of
the former has no bearing on the credibility of the witness, being perfectly
consistent with his innocence, and consequently should be incompetent to impeach him.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acs-EXEMPTION AS AFFECTED BY FACT
WHETHER OR Nor BENEFIT HAS BERN PAIM OvER-The plaintiff, a judgment
creditor of the defendant, seeks to attach a bank deposit of the defendant con-

sisting solely of funds received by him under the Workmen's Compensation
Law. The question is whether such moneys are exempt under the provision of
that act which reads: "Claims for compensation or benefits due shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, and from levy, execution and attachment"'
Held, that such moneys are exempt. Surace v. Dana, 248 N. Y. i8, 16i N. E.
315 (928).
Many cases involving a similar problem have arisen under statutory provisions exempting pensions and money to be paid by benefit associations. A
Com. v. Buck, supra note i.
Lights v. State, 21 Tex. Crim. Rep. 308 (i886); Carroll v. State, 32
Tex. Crim. Rep. 431, 24 S. W. ioo (1893); Jacksoa v. State, 33 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 281, 26 S. W. 284 (i894); Lindsey v. State, 299 S. W. 399 (Tex. 1927).
7State v. Forster, 153 La. 154, 95 So. 536 (i923) ; State v. Tolliver, 163
La. 1000, 113 So. 222 (1927).
' Foust v. State, 16I N. E. 371 (Ind. 1928); State v. Bowers, io8 Karm
i61, 194 Pac. 650 (i92) ; cf. dissenting opinion of Doster, C. 3., in State v.
Greenburg, 59 Kan. 404, 53 Pac. 6i (1898). Totten v. Totten, 172 Mich. 565,
X38 N. W. 257 (1912); Hill v. State, 42 Neb. 503, 6o N. W. 916 (1894);

Territory v. Chavez, 8 N. M. 528, 45 Pac.
Utah 143, 37 Pac. 258 (1894).
' WIGMORE, loc. cit. mtpra note 2.

1107

(1896) ; People v. Larson, lo

"°CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO. (Deering, 1923), §2051; People v. Gray, 148
Cal. 507, 83 Pac. 707 (19o6) ; cf. People v. Lando, 268 Pac. 439 (Cal. 1928).

Mo. REV. STAT. (i919) § 5439; State v. Ross, 306 Mo. 499, 267 S. W. 853
(1924). PA. ACT OF MAR. I5, 1911, P. L. 20, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 8174;
Coin. v. Doe, supra note i; Com. v. Brown, 264 Pa. 85, io7 AUt. 676 (i919).
"The conflict is reflected in the text books. Cf. UNDERHILL, CRIl. EvID.
(2d ed. igio) § 6i at p. io7 with ibid. (3d ed. 1923) § 387 at p. 556.
N. Y. ANN. CONs. LAws (2d ed. 1918) 9306.

RECENT CASES
similar exemption provided for by a federal pension statute2 has been construed by the United States Supreme Court to cover pension money only up
to the time it reaches the hands of the pensioner-after it has been received
by him, the exemption is lost 3 The earlier constructions given this provision by the state courts were irreconcilable. The majority held as above,' but
others took the view that the money was exempt even after it had been received by the pensioner.' In various states there are similar statutory provisions for the exemption of state and federal pensions which have been construed by almost all the courts to exempt pension money after it has reached
the pensioner.' Where a statute provides that the insurance to be paid by any
benefit society shall not be liable to attachment, while some courts hold that
money which has reached the beneficiary is not exempt,7 the better view would
seem to be otherwise.' Only a few cases have arisen under the workmen's
compensation acts of the different states involving this question, and all of
these which have come to the writer's attention hold the same as the principal
case
These decisions take the view that the legislature in making the provision intended to prevent workmen and their dependents from becoming objects of charity'" and that the provision exempting from attachment benefits
payable to employes should be liberally construed in their favor." This would
seem to be a valid interpretation of the legislature's intention.
217 STAT.

576 (1873), 38 U. S. C. §54: "No sum of money due or to be-

come due to any pensioner shall be liable to attachment . . . whether the

sum remains with the Pension Office or any agent thereof, or is in the course
of transmission to the pensioner entitled thereto."
'McIntosh v. Aubrey, x85 U. S. 122, 22 Sup. Ct. 561 (i9o2).
'Faurote v. Carr, io8 Ind. 123, 9 N. E. 350 (1886) ; Spelman v. Aldrich,
5 (s8g9); Pentz
126 Mass. 113 (1879); Aubrey v. McIntosh, io Pa. Super.
v. First Nat. Bank, 75 Pa. Super. I (x921); Rozelle v. Rhodes, 1i6 Pa. i29,
9 Atl. i6o (1887) ; Jardain v. Fairton, etc. Assn., 44 N. J. L. 376 (1882).
'Crow v. Brown, 81 Iowa 344, 46 N. W. 993 (i89o); Fayette County v.
Hancock, 83 Iowa 694, 49 N. W. 1040 (i89t ; Reiff v. Mack, 16o Pa. 265, 28
Adt. 699 (894); Bullard v. Goodno, 73 Vt. 88, 5o At. 544 (io).
'Price v. Savings Soc., 64 Conn. 362, 3o Atl. 139 (894) ; Burgett v. Fancher, 35 Hun. 647 (N. Y. 1885); Stockwell v. Malone Nat. Bank, 36 Hun.
583 (N. Y. i885) ; Benedict v. Higgins, i65 App. Div, 6zx, 151 N. Y. Supp. 42
(1915) ; Yates County Nat. Bank v. Carpenter, ix9 N. Y. 55o, 23 N. E. ixos
(i8go).
200, 58 N. E. 230 (igoo) ; Hathorn v. Robin'Martin v. Martin, 187 Ill.
son, 96 Me. 33, 5I Ad. 236 (igoi) ; Recor v. Commercial Savings Bank, 142
Mich. 479, io6 N. W. 8z (i9o5) ; Bull v. Case, i65 N. Y. 578, 59 N. E. 3bI
(igo).

8Holmes v. Marshall, 145 Cal'.777, 79 Pac. 534 (I9O5); First Nat. Bank
v. How, 65 Minn. 187, 67 N. V. 094 (I896) ; Coleman v. McGrew, 71 Neb.
8oi, 99 N. W. 663 (igo4); Matter of Lynch, 83 Hun. 462, 31 N. Y. Supp.
1038 (894).

"Poore v. Bowlin, 15o Tenn, 412, 265 S.W. 671 (1924) ; Frierson & Co.
v. Union Nat. Bank, 285 S.W. 94r (Tex. 1926); Gaddy v. First Nat Bank,
i5 Tex. 393, 283 S. W. 472 (1926).

oPost v.Burger, 216 N. Y. 544, II N. E. 351 (1916).
"Gaddy v.First Nat. Bank, supra note 9.

